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Relaxing Common Belief for Social Networks
NOAH BURRELL∗, University of Michigan, USA.
GRANT SCHOENEBECK∗, University of Michigan, USA.
We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis
of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze
revolt games on general graphs, including by giving an efficient algorithm that characterizes a
structural result about the possible equilibria of such games.
This extends priorwork on common knowledge and common belief, which has been too restrictive
for use in understanding strategic coordination and cooperation in social network settings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Common knowledge and its analogues (e.g. common belief) are fundamental in the analysis
of coordination and cooperation in strategic settings. Informally, common knowledge is the
phenomenon that, within a population, everyone knows that a proposition is true, everyone
knows that everyone knows that it is true, everyone knows that everyone knows that
everyone knows that it is true, and so on, ad infinitum. The existence of common knowledge
often shows up as an assumption that underlies some kind of strategic coordination. For
example, in the standard game theoretic setting, it is typically assumed that the agents
playing a game have common knowledge both of the payoffs of the game and of the
rationality of each agent. This assumption undergirds the agents’ ability to coordinate on
equilibria.
A rigorous investigation into the consequences of this type of assumption can be traced
back to Robert Aumann [2], who showed that if two rational agents have the same prior,
and their posteriors for an event are common knowledge, then their posteriors must be
equal (i.e. it is impossible for such agents to “agree to disagree”). Later work considered
whether assumptions about common knowledge, and the mathematical consequences of
those assumptions, were realistic for trying to explain economic phenomena. In particular,
it seemed unrealistic to expect agents to reason about infinite hierarchies of knowledge.
Initial attempts to address this critique involved truncating the infinite hierarchy that is
required in our informal definition of common knowledge after some large, but finite,
number of levels. However, this line of inquiry resulted in the discovery of “common
knowledge paradoxes” that arose from examples like Ariel Rubinstein’s Electronic Mail
Game [21]. Such examples demonstrated that in situations where common knowledge
was required for coordination, if the infinite hierarchy were truncated to be any finite
hierarchy, strategic agents behaved unexpectedly and unrealistically. That is, they behaved
very differently when a proposition was close to common knowledge, in the sense that
many—but only finitely many—hierarchies of knowledge were satisfied, then they did
when the proposition was actually common knowledge (and therefore infinitely many
hierarchies of knowledge were satisfied).
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An important breakthrough came from Dov Monderer and Dov Samet in 1989 [14].
Inspired by an earlier version of Rubinstein’s work [21] and the work of Aumann [2], Mon-
derer and Samet proposed an alternative to truncating the infinite hierarchy of knowledge:
relaxing the requirement of “knowledge” at each level in the hierarchy. They introduced
the notion of common belief—an analogous concept to common knowledge that is defined
by replacing “everyone knows” with “everyone believes with probability (at least) p” at
each place where it occurs in our informal definition of common knowledge. Under this
definition, they showed that common belief approximates common knowledge in precisely
the way that truncating the infinite hierarchy did not: When common knowledge of some
proposition is relaxed to common belief, agents behave in approximately the same way
they did when they had common knowledge of the proposition. For example, common
belief can be applied to generalize Aumann’s result that was mentioned above: when
rational agents have the same prior and their posteriors about an event are commonly
believed, these posteriors must be approximately equal.
In the same paper, they also detailed a key insight that allowed them to address the
critique that common knowledge might be too unrealistic to have explanatory power in
Economics. They showed that common knowledge has an alternative definition (used
implicitly in [2]), that is formally equivalent to the more natural definition, but simpler to
reason about. This alternative—inspired by the example of public announcements—defines
common knowledge in terms of events that are evident knowledge: events for which their
occurrence implies knowledge of their occurrence within the entire population. Common
belief has a similar formally equivalent, alternative definition in terms of events that are
evident belief : events for which their occurrence implies belief with probability at least p
of their occurrence within the entire population.
Here, it is worth noting that our work most heavily borrows from that of Monderer and
Samet and, as such, their paper [14] is highly recommended both as a primer for what
follows here and as an introduction to common knowledge and common belief in general.
In a somewhat orthogonal line of research, Michael Suk-Young Chwe studied common
knowledge (not common belief) on networks in the context of a revolt game [6, 7]. In his
setting, each agent has a threshold that represents the size of the revolt in which she would
agree to participate. For example, an agent with a threshold of 3 would need to know that
at least 2 other agents would participate in order to herself agree to participate in the revolt.
To decide whether this threshold is met, agents learn the thresholds of their neighbors.
They use this information (and knowledge of their 2-hop neighborhood in the graph) to
reason about which agents have their thresholds satisfied and consequently whether their
own threshold is satisfied. Because agents require absolute certainty in this setting, they
only consider their neighbors when conducting this reasoning.
The strict requirement that absolute certainty is necessary for an agent to revolt implies
that for a group of agents to revolt, it must be common knowledge among them that all of
their thresholds are satisfied. Consequently, the problem of finding groups of revolting
agents reduces to the problem of finding cliques of a certain size in the network. However,
an important innovation of Chwe’s work, in contrast to the settings described above, is that
common knowledge in his setting is a local phenomenon occurring within those cliques,
not a global phenomenon occurring within the entire population.
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Both approaches—that of Monderer and Samet and that of Chwe—are limited in their
usefulness in social network settings, because their respective notions are unlikely to
apply in many natural graphs that are used to model social networks. For example, an
Erdős-Rényi random graph of n vertices with p = 10n will almost certainly be sparse, so
population-level phenomenon like common belief will not arise. On the other hand, an
Erdős-Rényi random graph of n vertices with p = 12 would be unlikely to contain large
cliques, so the phenomenon of local common knowledge would be severely limited despite
the fact that each agent, in seeing about half the graph, should have a lot of information
about the entire population and might be expected to be able to coordinate with some
large fraction of it.
We propose that Monderer’s and Samet’s concept of common belief—itself a relaxation
of common knowledge—can be further relaxed to a notion of common belief among a
faction (i.e. a minimal-size subset) of the population, while retaining both its mathematical
simplicity (in being defined in terms of events that are evident belief) and its economic
explanatory power. We refer to this notion as factional belief.
Factional belief is a natural application of the ideas of Monderer and Samet to network
settings similar to those of Chwe. It retains from Chwe the idea that common knowl-
edge/belief can occur in only a subset of the population and still motivate their behavior.
However, it is not prohibitively strict, such that it would be unlikely to occur endogenously
in many natural graphs. Factional belief is not necessarily local—agents can and may need
to reason about agents outside of their neighborhood. As such, it does not require cliques.
1.1 Our Contributions
• We formally define a notion of factional belief (Section 2), which can be used to analyze
revolt games on general graphs (Section 3). Prior notions of common knowledge and
common belief were insufficient for this type of analysis.
• We provide an algorithm that characterizes a structural result about the types of
equilibria that are possible in instances of the network revolt games described in
Section 3 (Section 4) and a few natural extensions of those games (Section 5).
• We show that, surprisingly, it is sufficient for our algorithm to only have access to
the degree sequence of the network; additional details of the network beyond the
degree sequence are not relevant.
• We demonstrate the practical utility of our algorithms from Sections 4 and 5 by
applying them to simulated network data to explore how various parameters of
networks and of the model relate to the size of revolts that are supported in equilibria
of the network revolt game (Section 6).
1.2 Additional Related Work
The work of Stephen Morris is particularly notable when surveying the literature related to
common knowledge and common belief. Morris, often following the work of Monderer and
Samet, has done much theoretical work relating to common knowledge and common belief
[15, 17–19]. More recently, he has also collaborated with Benjamin Golub to study higher-
order reasoning, reminiscent the infinite hierarchy of reasoning in the initial definitions of
common knowledge and common belief, in network settings [10, 11].
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Underlying Morris’ work, above, and our work is our assertion that common knowledge,
common belief, and factional belief are useful, not just as mathematical concepts, but for
understanding real social and economic phenomena. Here, we briefly outline some relevant
work in applying common knowledge and common belief to explaining such phenomena.
One clear direction for future research is to try to similarly apply factional belief as an
explanatory tool in these and other settings.
Morris has applied common knowledge/belief to settings such as contagion [16] and
global games [20].
Chwe, in 2013, revisited his earlier work and expanded his purview to consider how
common knowledge is generated in society [8]. He proposed that the importance of rituals
in society can be understood from the perspective that rituals create conditions under
which common knowledge can be generated. This theory fits nicely with understanding
common knowledge through the lens of evident knowledge events. Another potential
direction for future research would be to try to mathematically model this ritualistic
generation of common knowledge.
Finally, common knowledge, common belief, and factional belief can be used as tools to
help understand the formation and transformation of social norms. In particular, Cristina
Bicchieri proposed and meticulously advocated for a definition of social norms of which
our definition of factional belief is very reminiscent [4].
2 DEFINING FACTIONAL BELIEF
For the following definitions, let (Ω, Σ, Pr) be a probability space, where Ω denotes a set of
states, Σ denotes a σ -algebra of events, and Pr denotes a probability measure on Σ. Let I
denote a set of agents.
For each i ∈ I , Πi is a partition of Ω into measurable sets with positive probability. It is,
therefore, a countable partition. For ω ∈ Ω, the element of Πi that contains ω is written
as Πi (ω). Πi can be interpreted as the information available to agent i . That is, Πi (ω)
is the set of states that are indistinguishable to i when i observes ω. Let Bpi (E) denote
the event that agent i believes in event E with probability at least p. Formally, we write
B
p
i (E) = {ω : Pr[E |Πi (ω)] ≥ p}. Lastly, for events E and F , we use the notation E ⊆ F to
denote that, whenever E occurs, F occurs.
The following examples are helpful to illustrate this notation.When rolling a fair die, with
equally probably outcomes in the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} we have {2, 4} ⊆ {Outcome is even}.
Similarly, when the die has been tossed, but the outcome has not been revealed, we have
the event B
1
2
i ({Outcome is even}) for any agent i .
This notation is borrowed from Monderer and Samet [14], and the rest of the terms and
claims in this section are defined and stated, respectively, to be analogous to those from
their paper.
Definition 2.1 (Evident (p, µ)-belief). An event E is an evident (p, µ)-belief if, whenever E
occurs, (at least) a µ fraction of the agents assign a probability of at least p to its occurrence.
That is:
∃ J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that for each j ∈ J , E ⊆ Bpj (E).
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Following, Monderer and Samet, we first define our notion of factional belief in terms of
events that are evident (p, µ)-belief. To maintain consistency with their work, we refer to
this notion of factional belief as common (p, µ)-belief.
Definition 2.2 (Common (p, µ)-belief). An event F is common (p, µ)-belief at ω ∈ Ω if
there exists an evident (p, µ)-belief event E such that ω ∈ E and
∃ J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that for each j ∈ J , E ⊆ Bpj (F ).
That is, F is common (p, µ)-belief whenever there is an event (E) that is an evident
(p, µ)-belief whose occurrence implies the existence of (at least) a µ fraction of agents that
believe with probability at least p in F . Note that any event E that is an evident (p, µ)-belief
is trivially also common (p, µ)-belief (with F = E).
Now, an important property shared by common knowledge and common belief is the
formal equivalence of their definitions in terms of evident events and their intuitive
definitions as infinite hierarchies. Common (p, µ)-belief retains this property. In order
to state this result formally in Proposition 2.4, we need to formally define the infinite
hierarchy, which is done below in Definition 2.3.
Informally, each level (n ≥ 1) in this hierarchy, refers to the event that there exists (at
least) a µ fraction of agents who believe with probability (at least) p in the previous level
of the hierarchy. The initial level (n = 0) is simply the relevant event F . So, written out
entirely, the full informal definition would be that an event F is common (p, µ)-belief if
there exists a µ fraction of agents who believe F with probability p, there exists a µ fraction
of agents who believe with probability p that there exists a µ fraction of agents who believe
F with probability p, and so on, ad infinitum.
Definition 2.3. For every event F and every 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 let
Ep,µ (F ) =
⋂
n≥1
Fnµ ,
where F 0µ = F and Fnµ is the event “∃ J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that ∀j ∈ J , Bpj (Fn−1µ )”.
Proposition 2.4. For every event F , every 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and every 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1:
(1) Ep,µ (F ) is an evident (p, µ)-belief and ∃ J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that ∀j ∈ J ,
Ep,µ (F ) ⊆ Bpj (F ).
(2) F is common (p, µ)-belief at ω if and only if ω ∈ Ep,µ (F ).
The proof of this proposition is essentially the same as the proof of the analogous
proposition (Proposition 2) in Monderer’s and Samet’s paper [14]. However, the details
of the proof are not particularly relevant or instructive with regard to our contributions
in this work, so we omit them here and consign them to Appendix A. The important
takeaway from this proposition, is, as noted above, the formal equivalence between the
hierarchical definition of common (p, µ)-belief (Definition 2.3) and the definition in terms
of evident belief (Definition 2.1). As with the analogous definitions for common knowledge
and common belief, the former definition is more intuitive and perhaps more natural, but
the latter definition is more mathematically convenient and is what we will reference in
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what follows. The latter definition is also a notion that better corresponds to how agents
might be expected to reason about this type of belief in reality, since it is unrealistic to
suppose that they consider infinite hierarchies of belief.
3 MODEL
LetG = (V ,E) be a graph and I be a set ofn agents, such that each vertexvi ∈ V corresponds
to an agent i ∈ I . We will think of G as representing a social network of strategic agents
who are participating in a revolt game. The graph G is common knowledge among the
agents.
Nature draws the state of the world s ∈ S according to a distribution DS and selects a
type ti ∈ T = {α ,ν } ∪X for each agent i , where X = ∪j {χj } is non-empty (and finite). The
types are selected independently at random according to a distribution DsT associated with
state s .
Each agent i will observe the type of each agent k ∈ I such that (vi ,vk ) ∈ E (this
set of agents constitutes the set of neighbors of i). The information resulting from this
observation—an agent’s type and the types of all of her neighbors—defines that agent’s
context. When agent i has the context c , we write it as c(i) = c . We use C to denote the set
of all contexts that are possible in G.
Ex ante, or, before selection of the state, the assignment of types, and the observation
of contexts, agents choose a pure strategy σ : C → {R,Y }, where {R,Y } is the set of
actions.1 A strategy profile (σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn) is collection of strategies for each agent. Let
σ−i = (σ1,σ2, . . . ,σi−1,σi+1, . . . σn) denote the strategies of all the agents except for i .
Similarly, ex post, or, after the selection of types and observation of contexts, an action
profile (a1,a2, . . . ,an) where ai = σi (c(i)) is a collection of actions for each agent.
Let R(a1,a2, . . . ,an) = {i ∈ [n] : ai = R} denote the set of agents who play the action
R (revolt) given their context and strategy. Agent i with type ti = t receives a payoff
according to the function f ti : {R,Y }n → [0, 1]:
f αi (a1,a2, . . . ,an) =
{
1, if ai = R,
0, otherwise,
f νi (a1,a2, . . . ,an) =
{
1, if ai = Y ,
0, otherwise.
and
f
χj
i (a1,a2, . . . ,an) =
{
1 − pj , if |R(a1,a2, . . . ,an)| ≥ µ j · n,
pj , otherwise,
where pj , µ j ∈ [0, 1] for each j.
We call σi a best-response to σ−i when σi maximizes agent i’s ex ante expected payoff
given σ−i , which, by linearity of expectation, is equivalent to maximizing her expected
1“Revolt” and “Yield,” respectively
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payoff for each c ∈ C (using the beliefs she would have about the contexts of the other
agents after observing c).
We say that a strategy profile (σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn) is an equilibrium when each strategy σi is
a best-response to σ−i .
Intuitively, the game is defined so that there is a natural strategy for each agent based
on type:
• Agents of type α should always revolt.
• Agents of type ν should never revolt.
• Agents of type χj should conditionally revolt:
– Each type χj is characterized by a pair of thresholds (pj , µ j ) that indicate an agent
of type χj should revolt when she believes that Pr[|R(a1,a2, . . . ,an)| ≥ µ j ] ≥ pj .
An important thing to note about this game is that when there are agents of type ν ,
there is not an equilibrium where each agent revolts regardless of her beliefs. Similarly,
when there are agents of type α , there is not an equilibrium where each agent chooses not
to revolt regardless of her beliefs.
Evenwithout these, though, there are still potentiallymultiple equilibria corresponding to
revolts of different sizes, and ourwork does not address equilibrium selection. Consequently,
in what follows, we will write that a revolt (of a particular size) is supported in equilibrium
instead of writing that a revolt will occur. Similarly, we write that agents are secure enough
to revolt when they sufficiently believe their thresholds are met instead of writing that
agents will revolt.
Lastly, in this work we primarily consider the largest revolts that are supported in some
equilibrium. Such revolts are supported by symmetric equilibria, in which each agent
adopts the same strategy—namely, the strategy detailed in the bullet points above.
3.1 Motivating Example
To see this model in practice and get a feeling for how agents need to reason about the
concepts that we have introduced, we will work through a modest example.
Suppose that G is a grid of n vertices embedded on a torus, so that each the vertex
associated with each agent is adjacent to the vertices representing exactly four other
agents (and there is no boundary). Thus, a context in this graph consists of the central
agent and her type plus the types of each of her neighbors in G. In this example, we will
have two types of agents: (1) Agents of type χ , who want to revolt conditionally; they feel
secure enough to revolt when the threshold pair (p = 25 , µ = 12 ) is satisfied. (2) Agents
of type ν , who never want to revolt. We will also have two equally-likely states: an anti-
government state A, where agents are of type χ with probability 45 and a pro-government
state B where agents are of type ν with probability 45 .
We also define the notion of a candidate agent. In this setting, for reasons that will
become clear in the proof of the following proposition, we refer to agents of type χ with
two or more neighbors of type χ as candidate agents.
Proposition 3.1. In this model, whenG is sufficiently large, the event that at least 12 of
the agents are candidate agents is an evident ( 25 , 12 )-belief. When it occurs, it is common
( 25 , 12 )-belief that supports a revolt of size 12 .
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Proof. First, we will compute Pr[State = A|c] for each context c and use the computed
values to demonstrate that our definition of candidate agents is the correct one for this
setting; candidates are likely to feel secure enough to revolt, based on their p-thresholds.
Each agent has 5 independent samples from the probability distribution defined by the
state, with which to calculate the probability of each state, given her information. The
first step in this is to compute the likelihood of her context given the state, which can be
calculated by evaluating the probability mass function of a binomial distribution with the
appropriate parameters. Then, the probability for each state given a certain neighborhood
can be calculated using Bayes’ rule. The results of these calculations are shown in Tables 1
and 2.
Now, agents of type χ that only have at most one other neighbor of type χ , believe that
the state is A with probability at most 15 , so they will not feel secure enough to revolt; a
revolt of size µ = 12 is very unlikely to be supported when the state is B, and they do not
sufficiently believe that the state is A.
As a result, it is exactly agents of type χ with contexts such that they have two or
more neighbors of type χ , which we defined earlier as candidate agents, in which we are
interested (cases with k ≥ 3 in Table 2). In particular, we are interested in the probability
that a majority of agents are candidates.
Claim. The probability that at least half the agents are candidates, given that the state is
A is at least 17393125 .
Proof of Claim. For this, we can try to count all the non-candidate agents and see how
likely they are to outnumber the candidates.
Let X count the number of non-candidate agents. Specifically, let X =
∑
i ∈[n]Xi , where
Xi is an indicator variable that is 1 if and only if agent i is not a candidate. For each Xi ,
therefore, the expectation of Xi is equal to the probability that i is not a candidate, which
can happen in three ways: (1) i is of type ν , (2) i is of type χ and has no neighbors of type
χ , or (3) i is of type χ and has one neighbor of type χ . The probability of (1) is trivially 15 .
Conditioned on i being of type χ , the respective probabilities of the remaining possibilities
are (2) 1625 and (3)
16
625 . To obtain unconditional probabilities for (2) and (3), we multiply each
conditional probability by 45 . Consequently, since the events (1), (2), and (3) are disjoint,
we have the following:
E[Xi ] = 15 +
4
5
(
1
625
)
+
4
5
(
16
625
)
=
693
3125 .
Therefore, by linearity of expectation, E[X ] = 693n3125 .
Now, we need to upper bound the probability that the number of non-candidate agents is
the majority. Ideally for this, we would like to use something tight, like a typical Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound. Unfortunately, here, the Xi ’s are not independent; the contexts of agents
that share neighbors are correlated, which complicates the calculation.
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For our more rigorous analysis later, we will insist on tighter probability bounds. But
for the sake of simplicity, in this example, Markov’s inequality is sufficient:
Pr[X ≥ n2 ] ≤
693n
3125
n
2
=
1386
3125 ≈ 0.44.
Consequently, the probability that at least half the agents are candidates, given that the
state is A, is at least (1 − 13863125 ) = 17393125 . □
Candidate agents can perform this exact same calculation and, further, they believe
that the state is A with probability at least 45 . Thus, when the graph is large enough that
the context of any individual agent is inconsequential in their reasoning about the total
fraction of candidate agents, the probability that they assign to at least half of the agents
being candidate agents is at least 45 ∗ ( 17393125 ) ≥ 25 .
That is, in sufficiently large graphs, candidate agents believe with probability at least 25
that at least 12 of the agents are candidate agents. As a result, the event that at least
1
2 of
the agents are candidate agents is an evident ( 25 , 12 )-belief. Consequently, when it occurs,
by definition, it is common ( 25 , 12 )-belief. In this event, a revolt of size 12 is supported, since
at least half of the agents have their thresholds satisfied, and consequently feel secure
enough to revolt. □
Pr[c |State = A] Pr[c |State = B]
k = 0 13125
1024
3125
k = 1 4625
256
625
k = 2 32625
128
625
k = 3 128625
32
625
k = 4 256625
4
625
k = 5 10243125
1
3125
Table 1. The likelihood, in each state, of hav-
ing a context with k agents of type χ .
Pr[State = A|k = x]
x = 0 11025
x = 1 165
x = 2 15
x = 3 45
x = 4 6465
x = 5 10241025
Table 2. The likelihood of state A, given a
context with x agents of type χ .
4 APPLYING FACTIONAL BELIEF: A COMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The network revolt game model described in Section 3 gives us a useful setting in which
to apply our definitions from Section 2 and demonstrate how they can provide insight
into strategic coordination. In this section, we explore the interaction between factional
belief and strategic coordination from a computational perspective, by trying to answer an
elementary question: When can we efficiently determine if strategic coordination (i.e. in
our model, a revolt) is supported under given conditions?
In pursuing an answer to this question, we seek to apply the intuition that we have
constructed in our motivating example to a more general setting. Toward that end, a
relatively modest generalization of the model used in the example—our Fundamental Case,
below—is rich enough to provide an interesting, non-trivial answer to our question and to
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provide robust intuition that guides us through the various extensions of the model that
we discuss in Section 5.
4.1 Fundamental Case: Low-Degree Graphs, Two States, and Three Types
Recall that our model requires a description of possible agent types and possible states
(which specify probability distributions over those types). For our initial case, there are
three agent types and two possible states.
Our focus will be on agents who want to revolt conditionally—agents of type χ—who
have the threshold pair (p, µ) for an arbitrary 0 ≤ p < 1 and 0 ≤ µ < 1. In some sense,
these are the truly “strategic” agents; they need to coordinate with other agents in order
to feel secure enough to revolt. There are also agents who always behave in a prescribed
manner, regardless of their contexts or the state: pro-government agents of type ν , who
will never revolt, and anti-government agents of type α , who will always revolt.
The possible states are A, an anti-government state, and B, a pro-government state. The
likelihood of each state, the values of p and µ for agents of type χ , and the corresponding
distributionsDAT andD
B
T over the types in each state, andDS the distribution over the states
are commonly known to the agents under the prior P . We require, as can be inferred from
the labels assigned to the states as being anti- and pro-government, that anti-government
agents should be more likely in the anti-government state. That is, Pr[ν |State = A] <
Pr[ν |State = B].
In this more concrete setting, we pose are able to pose a straightforward question: Given
values µ∗ and q∗, is a revolt of size (at least) µ∗ supported with probability at least q∗? We
refer to this problem as Revolt.
Definition 4.1 (Revolt). Revolt
Given: (G, P , µ∗,q∗), where G is a graph with n vertices and P = (p, µ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ) is the
common prior.
Question: Is a revolt of size at least µ∗ supported with probability at least q∗?
Note that there is a nuance regarding the timing of the network revolt game model
described in Section 3. Revolt considers the likelihood of revolt of a certain size being sup-
ported in a given network ex ante—i.e. before the selection of the state and the assignment
of types to agents.
Although the question posed by Revolt is straightforward to state, it is not straightfor-
ward to solve efficiently. In fact, we have the following hardness result, which we prove in
Appendix B:
Proposition 4.2. Revolt is NP-hard.
Consequently, we will instead consider a relaxed version of the problem that we will
be able to solve efficiently. In order to define this new problem, we will need two error
terms, which will be constants given as input: ϵ,δ > 0. We also introduce two additional
priors, as follows (recall P = (p, µ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ) is the common prior given as input to both
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problems):
P− = (p − δ , µ − ϵ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ),
P+ = (p + δ , µ + ϵ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ).
Now, we are ready to define our new problem, Promise Revolt.
Definition 4.3 (Promise Revolt). Promise Revolt
Given: (G, P , µ∗, ϵ,δ ), where G is a graph with n vertices, P = (p, µ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ) is the
common prior, and ϵ,δ > 0 are constants.
Output:When exactly one of the following cases is true, output the corresponding symbol:
Ω: A revolt of size µ∗ − ϵ is supported with probability q∗ ≥ 1 − δ under the prior P−.
A: A revolt of size µ∗ is supported with probability q∗ ∈ [Pr[State = A] − δ , Pr[State =
A] + δ ] under the prior P .
∅: A revolt of size µ∗ + ϵ is supported with probability q∗ ≤ δ under the prior P+.
Promise Revolt is named so as to emphasize that this it is a promise problem, in the
typical sense. The “promise” is that the given instance is such that exactly one of the cases
from the definition of the problem is true. Given that promise, the three cases are mutually
exclusive and any solution is required to always output the correct answer. It is exactly
this promise to exclude difficult inputs that makes Promise Revolt easier to solve than
Revolt.
Still, in providing an algorithm to solve Promise Revolt, we will see that the problem
has a structure that allows us to closely approximate Revolt by solving Promise Revolt
(for large graphs). This structure is discussed in more detail at the end of this subsection
(4.1), particularly with respect to Figure 1, which helps to illustrate this intuition.
Lastly, note that we assume all inputs to Revolt and Promise Revolt are given as
rational numbers. This leads us to state our first theorem:
Theorem 4.4. Given ϵ > 0, the prior P , and µ∗ ∈ [0, 1], there exists δ (n) ∈ 1exp(Ωϵ,P ( 3√n))
such that for any graph G with n vertices where the largest degree of any vertex is Oϵ,P
( 3√n) ,
Algorithm 3 can be used to solve Promise Revolt(G, P , µ∗, ϵ,δ = δ (n)) in polynomial time.
Before we get to the proof of Theorem 4.4, we briefly discuss our assumption that each
agent has a degree that isO
( 3√n) . Primarily, this assumption serves to simplify our analysis.
For simplicity, it is convenient to make some distinction between “low-degree” agents and
“high-degree” agents to highlight the fact that a prototypical high-degree agent would have
a lot more information about the state than a prototypical low-degree agent. However, any
particular choice of cutoff to separate high- and low-degree agents is somewhat arbitrary.
Here, we chooseO
( 3√n) , which is mathematically convenient for defining an upper bound
on our error function δ (n) in Theorem 4.4.
Given this cutoff, we focus first on the case where there are only low-degree agents,
which is sufficient to provide the guiding intuition that we will follow in the next section,
when we discuss broadening the setting in various ways. One such extension will involve
allowing vertices of arbitrary degree.
We now proceed by making several arguments which form the building blocks of the
proof of Theorem 4.4 that follows.
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ALGORITHM 1: Finding the size of largest revolt supported in each state.
Input: A graph G = (V ,E) of n vertices, the prior P = (p, µ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ).
Output: XA and XB , the maximum size of revolt supported in states A and B, respectively.
Let es (τ ) denote the expected fraction of type τ agents in state s .
Define the set of candidate states SC = {s ∈ {A,B} : es (χ ∪ α) ≥ µ}.
if SC = ∅ then
Xs = es (α) ∀s ∈ {A,B}.
end
if SC = {A,B} then
Xs = es (χ ∪ α) ∀s ∈ {A,B}.
end
if SC = {A} then
Let C(χ ) be the set of contexts centered around agents of type χ .
Define the set of candidate contexts CC = {c ∈ C(χ ) : Pr[State = A|c] ≥ p}.
(Below, we slightly abuse notation, treating CC as if it were a type when writing es (CC ).)
if eA(CC ∪ α) ≥ µ then
Xs = es (CC ∪ α) ∀s ∈ {A,B}.
end
else
Xs = es (α) ∀s ∈ {A,B}.
end
end
return XA, XB .
ALGORITHM 2: Comparing the size of the largest revolt supported in each state.
Input: XA, XB (output from Algorithm 1) and µ∗.
Output: Ω, A, or ∅.
if XA ≥ µ∗ and XB ≥ µ∗ then
return Ω
end
if XA ≥ µ∗ and XB < µ∗ then
return A
end
if XA < µ∗ and XB < µ∗ then
return ∅
end
Lemma 4.5. Algorithms 1 and 2 terminate in polynomial time with respect to the number
of agents.
Proof. The key for this property of Algorithm 1 is that contexts are identity-agnostic,
so the number of contexts is polynomial in n when the number of types is a constant.
Therefore, we are able to enumerate all of the possible contexts in polynomial time. For
each of these contexts c , we can compute the relevant probabilities—Pr[State = s |c] and
Pr[c |State = s] for both states s—using Bayes’ rule. The rest of the steps in the algorithm
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ALGORITHM 3: Solving Promise Revolt
Input: (G, P , µ∗, ϵ,δ ), where G is a graph of n vertices, P = (p, µ,DAT ,DBT ,DS ) is the common prior,
and ϵ,δ > 0 are constants
Output: Ω, A, ∅, or Null.
XA1 ,XB1 ← ALGORITHM 1(G, P = (p ′, µ ′,DAT .DBT ,DS )), where p ′ = p + δ3 , µ ′ = µ + ϵ3 .
S1 ← ALGORITHM 2(XA1 ,XB1 , µ∗).
XA2 ,XB2 ← ALGORITHM 1(G, P = (p ′, µ ′,DAT .DBT ,DS )), where p ′ = p − δ3 , µ ′ = µ − ϵ3 .
S2 ← ALGORITHM 2(XA2 ,XB2 , µ∗).
if S1 = S2 then
return S1
end
else
return Null
end
are linear in the number of contexts, and therefore also computable in polynomial time.
Algorithm 2 is trivially computable in constant-time. □
Having shown that they are polynomial-time computable, we now demonstrate the
correctness of Algorithms 1 and 2 under idealized conditions.
Claim. When agents believe with probability 1 that the actual size of the largest supported
revolt in each state will exactly equal its expected size, then Algorithm 1 correctly computes
the expected size of the largest revolt in each state. When, further, it is true that the actual
size of the largest supported revolt in each state will exactly equal its expected size, then
Algorithm 2 identifies the set of states in which revolt of size µ∗ is supported with no error.
Proof of Claim. Algorithm 1 first defines the set of candidate states—these are the
states in which it is possible, but not necessarily the case, that type-χ agents will feel
secure enough to revolt, because there are at least µ α- and χ -type agents. If there are no
such states, then only agents of type α will revolt. If both states are candidates, then all α-
and χ -type agents will feel secure enough to revolt: Agents of type α always revolt and
agents of type-χ have their µ threshold met in both states, by the definition of a candidate
state. As a result, their p threshold is also necessarily met, because the probability of the
state being either A or B is 1 ≥ p. The most interesting case is when only A is a candidate
state. In this case, only type χ agents who p-believe that the state is A will have their p-
threshold met. So, similarly to our example from Section 3.1, we call those agents candidate
agents (and refer to their contexts as candidate contexts.) If the number of candidate agents
and α-type agents, given that the state is A, is at least µ, then all of those agents feel secure
enough to revolt. This is true in any state, because even when the state is B, candidate
agents, by definition, p-believe that the state is A.
Algorithm 2 simply compares the size of the expected revolt in each state to µ∗ to decide
in which states, if any, a revolt of expected size at least µ∗ is supported. If the actual size of
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the revolt in any state is exactly equal to its expectation, as we assume, then Algorithm 2
introduces no error. □
Now, the assumption that the actual supported revolt exactly equals the expected size
of the supported revolt is, of course, too strict. However, we will be able to show that the
actual size of the supported revolt concentrates around its expectation, and consequently,
the errors in our algorithms decrease quickly as n grows.
Recall that computing the expected size of a supported revolt involves counting the
number of some subset of three kinds of agents: α-type agents, χ -type agents, and candidate
agents. For α-type and χ -type agents, it is simple to show that the number of such agents
concentrates around its expectation because agent types are assigned independently at
random.
Lemma 4.6. Given ϵ > 0, the probability that, in a given state, the number of agents of
type χ and of type α differ from the expected number of agents of type χ and of type α by a
multiplicative factor of ϵ is at most δ = δ (n) for some δ (n) ∈ 1exp(Ωϵ,P ( 3√n)) .
Proof. Because the agent types are drawn independently at random, we can use a
standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound on the expected number of each type of agents. Con-
sequently, the difference between the actual and expected number of each type of agent
decays exponentially with n, and therefore we can choose δ (n) ∈ 1exp(Ωϵ,P ( 3√n)) so that the
difference is trivially smaller. □
Counting the number of candidate agents, as foreshadowed in the Motivating Example
of Section 3.1, is somewhat more complicated. Here, we need to consider the contexts
of agents—not just their type—and agents’ contexts are correlated with the contexts of
their neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors in G. We will show, though, that as the
graph grows, the effect of this correlation is small. In fact, we will still be able to prove
an exponentially-decreasing bound on the difference between the actual and expected
number of candidate agents.
Lemma 4.7. Given ϵ > 0, the probability that, in a given state, the number of candidate
agents is less than the expected number of candidate agents by a multiplicative factor of ϵ is
at most δ = δ (n) for some δ (n) ∈ 1exp(Ωϵ,P ( 3√n)) .
Proof. Let XC be a random variable that denotes the number of candidate agents. We
can write XC =
∑n
i=1Xi,C where Xi,C is an indicator variable that indicates whether or not
agent i is a candidate.
As we have noted above, an agent’s status as a candidate is dependent on her context,
and as a result, the variables Xi,C are not independent. However—given our assumption
that the maximum degree of any vertex inG is O
( 3√n)—their dependence is constrained
enough that we are able to apply a useful exponential bound involving the fractional
chromatic number χ ∗(Γ) of the constraint graph Γ of the random variables Xi,C .
(See Theorem C.1 in Appendix C for additional details).
For our purposes, it is sufficient to use a trivial bound on the fractional chromatic number
of any graph. The fractional chromatic number of a graph is at most the chromatic number
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of the graph, which is at most the maximum degree of any vertex plus one. So in Γ, where
edges correspond to dependencies between pairs of random variables (Xi,C ,X j,C ), the
maximum degree of any vertex—and therefore the fractional chromatic number χ ∗(Γ)—is
Oϵ,P
(
n
2
3
)
.
Pr[|XC − E[XC ]| ≥ ϵn] ≤ 2 exp
(−2ϵ2n
χ ∗(Γ)
)
∈ 1
exp
(
Ωϵ,P
( 3√n) )
□
Lemma 4.8.
(1) Suppose Algorithm 1 is run with the given inputs, but with modified µ ′ = µ + ϵ3 and
p ′ = p + δ3 , and Algorithm 2 is run with the resulting XA and XB and the given µ
∗. If the
result is Ω, then a revolt of size µ∗ − ϵ is supported with probability at least 1 − δ under
the prior P . If the result is A, then a revolt of size µ∗ − ϵ is supported with probability at
least Pr[State = A] − δ under the prior P .
(2) On the other hand, suppose Algorithm 1 is run with the given inputs, with modified
µ ′ = µ − ϵ3 and p ′ = p − δ3 , and Algorithm 2 is run with the resulting XA and XB and
the given µ∗. If the result is ∅, then a revolt of size µ∗ + ϵ is supported with probability
at most δ under the prior P . If the result is A, then a revolt of size µ∗ + ϵ is supported
with probability at most Pr[State = A] + δ under the prior P .
Proof. This proof decomposes into two analogous arguments about (1) and (2), which
themselves each contain two analogous arguments. We include only the first one in detail
here, below, and claim the rest via analogy.
Claim. Suppose that, in instance (1), the result is Ω. Then, the probability that a revolt of
size µ∗ − ϵ is supported in both states is at least 1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) .
Proof of Claim. There are three cases for the nature of this revolt.
(I) The revolt consists of all α-type agents.
By Lemma 4.6, we know that, in either state, the probability that the expected number
of α-type agents differs from the expected number of α-type agents by amultiplicative
factor of ϵ is 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) . Therefore, the probability that a revolt of size µ
∗ − ϵ is
supported in both states is at least 1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) .
(II) The revolt consists of all α- and all χ -type agents.
In this case, the presence of χ -type agents slightly complicates the analysis. Actual
χ -type agents have slightly easier thresholds to satisfy (p and µ) than the χ -type
agents considered by the algorithms (p ′ and µ ′). Our algorithms determined that, in
expectation, agents with p ′ and µ ′ thresholds would feel secure enough to revolt.
Each actual χ -type agent, then, must also feel secure enough to revolt, not just in
expectation: By Lemma 4.6, the probability that the actual number each of α-type
and χ -type agents differs from its respective expectation by a multiplicative factor
of ϵ6 is
1
exp(Ω( 3√n)) . Combining these, then, χ -type agents believe with probability
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1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) ≥ p that at least µ
′ − ϵ3 = µ agents feel secure enough to revolt,
and are thus themselves secure enough to revolt. Applying Lemma 4.6 (from the
perspective of Algorithm 2 this time, not the perspective of χ -type agents) we again
incur two error terms of ϵ6 (one each for the χ - and α-type agents). Thus, we can
conclude the probability that a revolt of size µ∗ − ϵ is supported in both states is at
least 1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) .
(III) The revolt consists of all α-type agents and all candidate agents.
In the final case, we consider candidate agents instead of all agents of type χ , and
proceed exactly as we did in the second case, using Lemma 4.6 to conclude that the
number of α-type agents concentrate and Lemma 4.7 to conclude that the number of
candidate agents concentrates. Once again, the result is that the probability that a
revolt of size µ∗ − ϵ is supported in both states is at least 1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) .
□
Claim. Suppose that, in instance (1), the result is A. Then, the probability that a revolt of
size µ∗ − ϵ is supported in both states is at least Pr[State = A] − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) .
Proof of Claim. The proof of this claim is analogous to the previous proof, where
events that are assigned probability at least 1 − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) are instead assigned probability
at least Pr[State = A] − 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) . □
The proof of the analogous claims for (2) are themselves analogous to the above cases
for (1).
Finally, we note here that when χ -type agents decide whether or not their thresholds
are satisfied, they are not solely relying on their estimates of the fractions of different
kinds of agents, as we describe above. They have additional knowledge, since they see
the realized types of the agents in their context. However, for small graphs, δ (n) can
be chosen to account for this. As the graph grows, since each agent has at most O
( 3√n)
neighbors, the consequences of observing the types of a few adjacent agents is negligible
after conditioning on the state. As a result, for large enough n, after the agent reasons
about the state, the probabilistic effect of the agent viewing the types in her context is
subsumed by the ϵ error term. Furthermore, the appropriate choice of δ (n) also accounts
for the 1exp(Ω( 3√n)) terms present in each of the claims stated above, for each n. □
Proof of Theorem 4.4. It follows from Lemma 4.5 that Algorithm 3 terminates in poly-
nomial time with respect to the inputs G and P . We also note that Algorithm 3 terminates
in polynomial time with respect to 1ϵ and
1
δ .
Further, it follows from Lemma 4.8 that when Algorithm 3 outputs a case, that case
is always true. It only remains to show that when exactly one case in the statement of
Promise Revolt is true, then Algorithm 3 necessarily outputs that case:
Here, the key is our use of three different potential revolt sizes (µ∗ − ϵ , µ∗, and µ∗ + ϵ)
and 3 different priors (P−, P , and P+) in defining the three cases of Promise Revolt. By
promising that exactly one of those three cases is true, we guarantee that the values of µ and
p are sufficiently far—distance at least ϵ for µ and distance at least δ for p—from the crucial
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decision thresholds in Algorithm 1 (e.g. the value eB(χ ∪ α), which is used to determine
whether or not B is a candidate state)2. This ensures that both calls to Algorithm 1 will
return the same values.
We can illustrate this counterfactually:
Let µ = eB(χ ∪ α) + ϵ2 with eB(χ ∪ α) > µ∗ > eB(CC ∪ α) and let eA(CC ∪ α) > µ + ϵ2 .
Then,A and B would both be candidate states under the prior P−. As a result, Algorithm 1
(run with prior P−) would return XA = eA(χ ∪ α) and XB = eB(χ ∪ α). Note that XA >
XB > µ
∗, so Algorithm 2 would return Ω when run with inputs XA, XB , and µ∗. The same
analysis holds for P− with µ and p incremented by ϵ3 and
δ
3 , respectively, so applying
Lemma 4.8 implies that the case Ω is true.
On the other hand, only A would be a candidate state under the prior P . Algorithm 1
run with the prior P would return XA = eA(CC ∪ α) and XB = eB(CC ∪ α). Run with these
inputs (and µ∗), Algorithm 2 would return A. The same analysis holds for P with µ and p
incremented and decremented by ϵ3 and
δ
3 , which by Lemma 4.8 implies that the case A is
true. We can conclude that these values of µ and µ∗ must be excluded by our promise for
any input to Promise Revolt for which our assumed constraints hold.
An argument similar to this counterfactual argument suffices to exclude any value of p
or µ that is insufficiently far from a crucial decision threshold in Algorithm 1 (along with
associated constraints on µ∗) present in an instance of Promise Revolt. □
Now we can discuss the information that we gain from solving Promise Revolt. In
doing so, it is useful to refer to Figure 1, which contains the following illustration: Given
µ∗, we identify all values of q for which a revolt of size µ∗ is supported with probability at
least q (dark blue and yellow regions), all values of q for which revolt of size µ∗ may be
supported with probability q (light blue, yellow, and grey regions), and all values of q for
which a revolt of size µ∗ is supported with probability strictly less than q (white regions).
The blurry regions between distinct colors represent the inputs to Promise Revolt for
which two of the cases would overlap (and are therefore excluded from the set of inputs
by the “promise”).
If we could perfectly solve Revolt, then we would be able to perfectly define the
boundaries—there would be no blurry regions between distinct colors, as in Figure 1. The
shape of the resulting figure would characterize the equilibria of the network revolt game
in the following sense: The blue column (corresponding to values of µ∗ for which only
case Ω of Promise Revolt is true) would show the sizes of revolts that are supported
in equilibrium with high probability regardless of the state, the next yellow and white
column (corresponding to values of µ∗ for which only case A is true) would show the sizes
of revolts that are supported in equilibrium with high probability given that the state is
A, and the last grey and white column (corresponding to values of µ∗ for which case ∅
is true) would show the sizes of revolts that, with high probability, are not supported in
2Whether or not a decision threshold is in the set of crucial decision thresholds—the thresholds from which
our promise guarantees p and µ are sufficiently far—depends on µ∗. In addition to eB (χ ∪α), it can also include
eA(CC ∪ α) and the value of p below which eA(CC ∪ α) ≥ µ holds for candidate contexts and above which
eA(CC ∪ α) < µ.
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Ω A ∅0 eB ±  eA ±  1
δ
Pr[State = A]± δ
1− δ
µ
q
Fig. 1. Illustrating what we learn from solving Promise Revolt in an archetypal case.
Here, eB and eA denote the expected size of the revolt supported in states B and A, respectively.
equilibrium (or, equivalently, the sizes of revolts that are supported in equilibrium with
low probability).
Although we cannot perfectly solve Revolt, as shown in Figure 1, solving Promise
Revolt with Algorithm 3 allows us to approximate this shape. By choosing ϵ to be very
small, we can make the boundary cases only relevant for very small subsets of possible
values of µ∗ and values of µ in the prior P . And, as we have shown via the proof of
Theorem 4.4, as n grows, δ (n) quickly becomes very small. Consequently, the range of
possibly forbidden values ofp in the prior P also quickly becomes small and the probabilities
for each class of distinct equilibria described above (when they exist), converge to 1,
Pr[State = A], and 0, respectively.
Lastly, we note that an interesting and surprising corollary to our analysis above is
that Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 never use any information about the graph beyond the degree
sequence ofG—an anonymous list that records the degree of each vertex in the graph. That
is, our algorithms require a list of the degrees of the agents, but do not require that any
degree value be labelled with the identity of any agent, nor do they require any further
information about the set of edges in the graph. Rather, the results of the algorithms are
valid for any graph that is consistent with the provided degree sequence, because the
concentration of the fraction of candidate agents and agents of each type supersedes the
additional structure imposed by any concrete edge set consistent with the degree sequence.
We record this fact with the following proposition:
Proposition 4.9. To compute Promise Revolt in polynomial time, we only require the
degree sequence of the graph G; the graph itself is not required.
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5 BROADENING THE SETTING
The core intuition from our analysis above actually applies to a broader class of settings
than that of Section 4.1. The additional complexity present in the broader settings generally
warrants additional complexity in the analysis, but the core of the argument follows the
same reasoning in each case. As a result, we briefly consider the broader settings in the
following sections and illustrate how the logic of the initial analysis can be extended to
cover those cases. In doing so, we focus on changes to Algorithm 1; the subsequent changes
required to adapt Algorithms 2 and 3 are straightforward.
5.1 Smallest Supported Revolt
Algorithm 1 computes the expected size of the largest supported revolt in each state and
Algorithm 2 compares the result with some given value µ∗ to see in which states, if any, the
size of supported revolt is at least µ∗. However, this setting has a natural symmetry, which
allows us to similarly compute the expected size of the smallest supported revolt in each
state with Algorithm 1 (and compare the results to some given value using Algorithm 2).
To do this, we define DA′T = D
B
T , but swapping the probabilities of α- and ν-type agents
(so that PrDA′T [α] = PrDBT [ν ], and vice versa) and similarly define D
B′
T = D
A
T , swapping the
probabilities of α- and ν-type agents. These definitions retain the required property that
Pr[ν |State = A] < Pr[ν |State = B]. Then, we run Algorithm 1 with the input G and the
prior P = (1 − p, 1 − µ,DA′T ,DB
′
T ,DS ).
Intuitively, this corresponds to the smallest supported revolt for the following reason:
An agent of type χ feels secure enough to revolt when she believes with probability at
least p that at least a µ fraction of agents will feel secure enough to revolt. Conversely, she
does not feel secure enough to revolt when she believes with probability at least 1 − p that
at least a 1 − µ fraction of agents will not feel secure enough to revolt. As a result, in the
setting with the modified inputs, as described, agents who feel secure enough to revolt
(including α-type agents) correspond precisely with agents who do not feel secure enough
to revolt in the original setting (just as α-type agents in the modified setting correspond
to ν-type agents in the original setting). Algorithm 1 computes the expected size of the
largest supported revolt in each state, so in the modified setting, it computes a value that
corresponds to the expected size of the largest group of agents, in some equilibrium of the
original setting, who do not feel secure enough to revolt. Since this value is maximized,
the size of the supported revolt is minimized. The precise expected size of that minimum
revolt in each state is 1 − Xs for each Xs returned by the algorithm.
5.2 General Graphs
Suppose that we impose no restriction on the degree of the vertices in G in the statement
of Theorem 4.4. It turns out that our results still hold. The existence of high-degree χ -
type vertices (i.e. those that would not exist when we assume an O
( 3√n) bound on the
maximum degree of any vertex), complicates the analysis, but only in the case where A is
the only candidate state. WhenA and B are both candidate states, we only need to calculate
the expected number of all χ -type agents, regardless of their degree. When there are no
candidate states, χ -type vertices are irrelevant.
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When A is the only candidate state, however, there is a key difference: The presence of
high-degree agent contexts in the set of candidate contexts would affect our earlier analysis
using Theorem C.1 (in the proof of Lemma 4.7), because the contexts of high-degree agents
are correlated with many other agents’ contexts.
Because of this, though, high-degree agents (with degree at least c · 3√n for sufficiently
large c) have a unique perspective on the graph; their contexts contain a significant amount
information that they can use in determining the state. More concretely, suppose that
agent i is a high-degree agent and let N (i) be the set of neighbors of i in G.
Let X =
∑
j ∈N (i)X j , where
X j =
{
0, if j is type ν ,
1, if j is type α or type χ .
Now, for any ϵ0 > 0, applying a standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, we have:
Pr
[
|X − E[X ]| ≥ ϵ0
(
c · 3√n
)]
≤ 2 exp
(
−2(ϵ0c)2n 23
n
1
3
)
∈ 1
exp
(
Ωϵ,P
( 3√n) ) . (1)
In particular, if we choose ϵ0 such that |E[X |State = A] − E[X |State = B]| > 2ϵ0
(
c · 3√n) ,
then agent i (and by the same argument, any high-degree agent) can correctly determine
the state with enough accuracy that their error can be absorbed into the δ error term
with an appropriate choice of δ (n). As a result, when the state is A, all high-degree χ -type
agents will behave like candidate agents (recall that A is a candidate state).
However, for computational purposes, we will not lump them in with the low-degree
candidate agents, because Lemma 4.7 can only apply to low-degree candidates. Instead,
in first the if statement after the condition that A is the only candidate state (the line in
Algorithm 1 that reads “if eA(CC ∪ α) ≥ µ then”), we calculate eA(CC ∪ α ∪ Hχ ) instead
of just eA(CC ∪ α), where Hχ refers to the set of high-degree χ -type vertices. If this is at
least µ, then when we calculate XA, we include Hχ . However, when we calculate XB , we
only include Hχ if eB(CC ∪ α ∪Hχ ) ≥ µ, since those high-degree agents will not p-believe
that the state is A regardless of the state the way that (low-degree) candidate agents will.
If eB(CC ∪ α ∪ Hχ ) < µ, we calculate XB = eB(CC ∪ α), as described in Algorithm 1.
Next, we must show it is possible for the agents (and the algorithm) to accurately
calculate the expected number of high-degree agents of type χ and know that the actual
number of such agents sufficiently concentrates around that expected number. Here, we
can rely on the fact that the agents and the algorithm know the degree sequence of the
graph. There is some subtlety involved: If the number of high-degree agents is small—less
than ϵn—then we cannot provide a very useful concentration bound for the number of
high-degree agents of type χ . However, we can essentially ignore the high-degree agents
in this case and absorb the error we incur by ignoring them into our choice of δ (n).
On the other hand, if there are at least ϵn high-degree agents, we can again use a
standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound to conclude that the actual number of high-degree
χ -type agents will, with high probability, be close to the expected number of such agents.
The error here will be smaller than the error from Lemma 4.7 and so can be absorbed there.
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Finally, there is one additional subtlety we must address for high-degree agents. While
it is true that, as previously mentioned, their contexts contain a significant amount of
information that they can use in determining the state, their contexts actually contain
more than just information about the state—they contain information about the actual
realization of types for a significant number of agents. This point is the primary conceptual
reason to make the distinction between high-degree and low-degree agents in the first
place. Consequently, we need to show that high-degree agents tend to behave as if they
only knew the state, when in fact it is possible that the number of agents of a certain type
in their context differs greatly from its expectation and as a result they have additional
information to use beyond the state of the world. For this, we again appeal to our previous
argument that resulted in the bound expressed by the inequality (1), above.
That argument demonstrates that it is highly improbable for the information in a high-
degree agent’s context to contradict what their belief would be solely given knowledge
of the state. For example, if a high-degree agent uses her context to determine that the
state is A, with high probability it will not also be the case that the context that she uses
to make that determination has (far) fewer agents of any type than would be expected
given that the state is A. Consequently, a high-degree agent will tend to act as if she is
just calculating expectations and acting off of them (like a low-degree agent would), even
though in actuality she has quite a bit of additional information.
5.3 A Larger Set of States
Suppose that there arem states in S , with an associated probability distribution DsT over
the set of three agent types T for each s ∈ S . Intuitively, the key insight is similar to the
case when A and B are both candidate states in our fundamental setting: When an agent
p-believes that the true state is in some subset of the states, then she must believe that her
µ threshold would be satisfied in each of the states in that subset in order for her to feel
secure enough to revolt.
Guided by this intuition, we modify Algorithm 1 in the following way: As before, we
identify the set of candidate states by determining for which states es (χ ∪ α) ≥ µ. If all the
states are candidate states, then as in the analogous instance for the two-state setting, there
is no need to reason about belief. So, we set Xs = es (χ ∪ α) for each state s . On the other
hand, if not all of the states are candidate states, then we do need to reason about belief.
First, we set CC , the set of candidate contexts, to contain the contexts of all agents who
believe with probability at least p that the state is in some subset of the candidate states.
Then, for each state we compute es (CC ∪α). If for some state s ′ in the set of candidate states
es ′(CC ∪ α) < µ, then we remove s ′ from the set of candidate states and recompute the set
of candidate contexts. We repeat this iterative removal procedure until es (CC ∪ α) ≥ µ for
all states s in the current set of candidate states. Once this is true (or the set of current
candidate states is empty), then Xs = es (CC ∪ α) for all the current candidate states and
Xs = es (α) in the remaining states.
Essentially, this procedure succeeds, because each time we define the set of candidate
states, we are as optimistic as possible about the number of agents who may feel secure
enough to revolt. This, though, is not too optimistic—i.e. we do not include any superfluous
agents—because when all of the states in the set of candidate states satisfy es (CC ∪ α) ≥ µ,
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then all of the agents with candidate contexts feel secure enough to revolt, based on our
intuition above.
More formally, we can use an inductive argument: The initial set of candidate contexts
contains the contexts of every agent for whom it is possible that they will feel secure
enough to revolt. At each step when we remove contexts from the set of candidate contexts,
any agent with a context that is removed will never feel secure enough to revolt. They do
not feel secure enough to revolt with the given set of candidate contexts and α-type agents,
and this set, at each step in the iteration, is maximal. Thus, at each step the set CC ∪ α
contains every agent who feels secure enough to revolt. So, when the iteration terminates,
the resulting (possibly empty) set of agents in CC ∪ α that all feel secure enough to revolt
must be the largest such set.
The number of steps in this procedure is polynomial inm, the number of states, so we
consider it still to be efficient.
It is worth noting that this result is driven by the specific way we have defined the
problem. In our setting, we are only required to consider the equilibriumwith the maximum
revolt size in each state. As we have shown, enumeration of all of the subsets of states is
not required to compute this. However, if we were to try to characterize all of the equilibria
of our network revolt game, without making any further assumptions on the states, a
stronger method, potentially including enumeration of all of the subsets of states, would
be necessary.
6 EXPERIMENTS
Beyond the theoretical insight they provide, our algorithms from Section 4 also have
practical utility for exploring the relationship between strategic coordination (i.e. a revolt
supported in some equilibrium) and various parameters—both parameters of network
models from which the graph G can be generated and parameters of the prior P . To
demonstrate this utility, we return to the concrete setting of our motivating example. For
convenience, the relevant parameters of this setting are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Parameter Value
p 25
µ 12
Table 3. Parameter values for the prior from
our motivating example.
s = A s = B
Pr[State = s] 12 12
Pr[α |State = s] 0 0
Pr[χ |State = s] 45 15
Pr[ν |State = s] 15 45
Table 4. The distributions of states and types
from our motivating example.
In the following subsections, we focus on how the size of the largest supported revolt in
expectation in each state varies with the chosen parameters. That is, we apply Algorithm 1
to compute our dependent variables.
However in general, Algorithm 3 also has practical utility. For example, we are able apply
Algorithm 3 to instantiate concrete constructions of Figure 1 in a given setting with an
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Ω A ∅
0.03616± 0.005 0.77824± 0.005 1
0.005
0.5± 0.005
0.995
µ
q
Fig. 2. Instantiating Figure 1 in the setting of our motivating example, with δ = ϵ = 0.005.
appropriate choice of δ (given ϵ and the prior). For the setting of our motivating example,
this is illustrated in Figure 2.
6.1 Varying Parameters of Network Models
In this experiment, we explore the relationship between the size of the largest supported
revolt in expectation—denoted as in Figure 1 by es for the state s ∈ {A,B}—and the
parameters of the various network models described below. d-regular graphs, which have
constant degree sequences, serve as a baseline which helps us interpret the results from
the other three network models. Each of the other models are each common social network
models that generate graphs according to two parameters. The first parameter for each
social network model is the number of vertices n, which we set to n = 1000 for each model.
The second parameter is unique to the model (we discuss the details for each model in the
associated paragraph below). We treat these parameters as the independent variables.
6.1.1 Methods. For constant-degree graphs, the degree sequence is deterministic given
the degree d . So, we ran an implementation of Algorithm 1 a single time with a degree
sequence consisting of 1000 entries equal to d and the prior P from our motivating example
(see Tables 3 and 4) as input and recorded the output values.
For the social network models, the generated degree sequences are not deterministic. So,
for each social network model and for each value of the relevant parameter, we generated
100 graphs of size n = 1000 from the model with that particular parameter value. Then,
for each of the 100 generated graphs, we ran our implementation of Algorithm 1 with the
degree sequence of the graph and the prior P from our motivating example as input and
recorded the mean of the output values (i.e. the average es for each state s).
The results are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 6.1—Exploring the relationship between eA and eB and the underlying
parameters of various network models in the setting of our motivating example.
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Constant Degree Sequence. For constant degree sequences, the relevant parameter is d ,
the degree of each vertex.
As we noted above, the degree sequence is deterministic given d and it is trivial to
generate. Furthermore, the output of Algorithm 1 is agnostic to n, so the choice of n = 1000
is somewhat irrelevant. The result would be the same for any n, so the key constraint is
whether a d-regular graph on n vertices exists for given n and d . This is the case for any
n ≥ d + 1 such that nd is even, and therefore is true for n = 1000.
Power-Law Degree Sequence. For power-law degree sequences, the relevant parameter
is γ , which represents the exponent of a power-law distribution. Specifically, in a graph
with a power-law degree distribution, the probability of observing a vertex with degree d
is proportional to d−γ .
For our experiment, we used the powerlaw package in Python [1] to generate integer
sequences of length n = 1000 which are distributed according to a power-law distribution
with exponent γ and then used the Havel-Hakimi algorithm implementation from the
networkx package in Python to determine whether the sequences corresponded to feasible
graph degree sequences [12]. This two-step process was repeated until we had 100 such
feasible degree sequences for each value of γ .3
Barabási-Albert Graph Degree Sequence. For degree sequences from Barabási-Albert
graphs (also referred to as preferential attachment graphs) [3], the relevant parameter is
m, which represents the number of edges that “incoming” vertices attach (preferentially)
to “existing” vertices.4
For our experiment, we used a generator from the networkx package in Python to
generate Barabási-Albert Graphs [12].
Erdős-Rényi Graph Degree Sequence. For degree sequences from Erdős-Rényi random
graphs, the relevant parameter is pedge, which represents the probability that an edge
between any fixed pair of vertices will exist in the graph after the edges are sampled.
For our experiment, we used a generator from the networkx package in Python to
generate Erdős-Rényi Graphs [12].
6.1.2 Results. As illustrated in the two columns of Figure 3, the results from both states
display interesting phenomena and the distinct states have distinct features of interest.
State A. For each type of degree sequence, we see that eA displays non-monotonicity
with respect to the parameter serving as the independent variable.
The results from the constant degree sequence are useful in interpreting this phenom-
enon. First, we see that there are parity effects—agents of type χ with odd degrees are
more likely to sufficiently believe that the state is A. In the most extreme case, in fact,
agents of type χ with degree one will always sufficiently believe that the state isA, because
regardless of their neighbor’s type, they will believe that the state is A with probability at
least 12 >
2
5 (the value of p in the prior). Second, controlling for the parity effects and the
3The range of γ in our experiments was somewhat constrained by this feasibility checking. For γ < 1.7,
generating even one sequence that corresponded to a feasible graph was intractable.
4See Chapter 5 of Jackson’s book on networks for an overview of preferential attachment models [13].
Burrell and Schoenebeck 26
unique case of the degree-one agents, agents with higher degrees tend to be more likely to
correctly determine the state.
This observations can be applied to explain the non-monotonicity we observe in the
results for the degree sequences drawn from social network models. For the Barabási-Albert
and Erdős-Rényi graphs, as with constant degree sequence graphs, the modal degree value
in the graph increases monotonically with the independent variable parameter, so we
observe non-monotonicity in the lower values of the relevant parameter as degree 2 vertices
become more common than degree 1 vertices. For the power-law degree sequences, the
modal degree value is 1 for all relevant values of γ , but the frequency of degree 1 vertices
increases monotonically withγ . The non-monotonicity in the lower values of the parameter
corresponds to a small range in which degree 2 vertices become more common, and the
effect of the increasing frequency of degree 1 vertices is not yet large enough to offset the
effect of the greater frequency of vertices of degree 2.
State B. For each type of degree sequence, the shape of the curves for eB can be explained
with roughly the same explanation used for eA above. The key differences is that agents of
type χ with degree one are no longer an exception to the trend that higher-degree agents
tend to be more accurate in determining the state (after controlling for parity effects). In
particular, this explains why we see the non-monotonicity of eA for the degree sequences
drawn from social network models, but not of eB .
The more interesting phenomenon is that the range of eB is significantly larger than
the range of eA for each graph. This phenomenon is relatively simple to explain: it is
uncommon for low-degree agents of type χ—and impossible for such agents with degree
one—to observe a context that convinces them that the state is more likely to be B, since
their own type provides evidence against this. Their own evidence is weighted highly,
because their total amount of evidence is small.
Even in light of this explanation, though, it is striking that we see eB range from including
almost every agent of type χ to almost no agents of type χ (or just over half of the agents of
type χ , in the case of the power-law degree sequences). Even excluding parameter values
where degree one agents proliferate (which produce the most extreme values of eB ), the
range of eB still varies significantly more than the range of eA. Consequently, when the
state is B, we could expect that a significant fraction of the agents of type χ would feel
secure enough to a revolt in conditions that would be very unlikely to support a revolt
in which they would feel comfortable participating. This phenomenon is of particular
interest with regard to the formation and maintenance of unpopular social norms like the
culture of excessive alcohol consumption in American colleges and universities and the
more general phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance [4–6].
6.2 Varying p in the Prior
In this experiment, we explore the relationship between eA and eB and the value of the
parameter p in the prior. Recall that p represents the belief threshold required for agents
of type χ .
6.2.1 Methods. For this experiment, we first fix the underlying parameters of the degree
sequences that we varied in the previous experiment so that for each degree sequence,
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Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 6.2—Exploring the relationship between eA and eB and the value of
the parameter p in the prior for various network models with average degree 4 in the setting of
our motivating example.
the average or expected degree for each vertex will be 4. Thus, each model is expected to
produce degree sequences that have the same average degree, but with different variances.
For the constant degree sequence this is accomplished with d = 4, for the degree sequences
of Barabási-Albert graphs it is withm = 2, and for the degree sequences of Erdős-Rényi
graphs it is with pedge = 1250 .
5 As before, for all of the degree sequences, we set n = 1000.
With those parameters, we generated graphs and ran Algorithm 1 as in the previous
experiment—running Algorithm 1 once for the constant degree sequence and generating
100 graphs and recording the average outputs of Algorithm 1 for the social network models
—for each value of p (i.e. p between 0.05 and 0.95, incremented in steps of size 0.05).
The results are illustrated in Figure 4.
6.2.2 Results. The behavior of eA and eB for each type of degree sequence in this experi-
ment is easy to predict—they both decrease monotonically in steps as p increases. As a
result, in this experiment, it is more interesting is to compare across the different degree
sequences. As an example, for degree sequences from Barabási-Albert graphs, the values
of eA and eB are somewhat lower than the analogous values for degree sequences from
Erdős-Rényi graphs for relatively high values of p—the values where we might expect p
thresholds to be for real agents contemplating a potentially costly action like violating an
existing social norm. This might indicate that in real social networks—which in terms of
degree sequences, among the three models in this experiment, are best approximated by
Barabási-Albert graphs—we might expect agents to be more conservative about taking
costly actions than they would be in random graphs. On the other hand, the opposite is
true for p values that are closer to, but still above, 12 , so we might expect agents in real
social networks to be relatively less conservative for actions with a moderate cost.
5For this experiment, the inclusion of power-law degree sequences for some fixed γ would be somewhat redun-
dant, because the degree sequences of Barabási-Albert graphs behave according to a power-law distribution
with γ = 3.
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7 DISCUSSION
We proposed that the notion of common belief could be relaxed to a notion of factional
belief in order to be more suited to social network settings and gave a natural definition of
factional belief, drawing heavily from previous work on common belief. We then applied
this definition theoretically and experimentally in a setting inspired by prior work about
common knowledge and revolt games on networks to show how this definition moves
beyond the limitations of previous work by being applicable in general graphs.
7.1 OpenQuestions and Future Work
The most clear direction for future work is to continue to apply factional belief in new
settings and use it as a tool to understand strategic coordination and cooperation on
networks. In particular, as mentioned in the introduction, the work of Stephen Morris
provides many examples of applying common belief as a tool for gaining insight into a
diverse range of settings. We believe that applying factional belief can yield similar results
in social network settings, and that this paper represents an initial step in that process.
Additionally, though, there are some more subtle technical open questions regarding
our definition of factional belief that are also worth exploring in future work that we state
below.
(1) Considering our definition of factional belief from the perspective of an infinite
hierarchy of reasoning, akin to the initial definition for common knowledge that we
provided (2.3), with regard to the µ fraction of agents at each step in the hierarchy, it
is not required by our definition that this be the same µ fraction of agents at each
step in the hierarchy. However, it is not clear whether or not this should always be
the case. Is it possible to describe an event that is common (p, µ)-belief, but for which
the infinite hierarchy refers to a different µ fraction of agents at some step? If so,
what are the consequences of this for strategic coordination and cooperation?
(2) It is not too difficult to modify the setting described in Section 4 to create a model
where the underlying event that supports revolt does not necessarily neatly reduce to
a single event that is common (p, µ)-belief. For example, if there are multiple types of
conditionally-revolting agents with different p and µ thresholds, the event supporting
revolt is more like a µ fraction of agents believe with sufficient probability that their
thresholds are satisfied. This event encompasses common p-beliefs among certain
agents of the same type regarding their µ thresholds, but not precisely common
(p, µ)-beliefs. Is there a more general definition of factional belief that allows for the
existence of different thresholds for different types of agents to still be encompassed
in a single event that is a factional belief among all of the agents who feel satisfied
enough to revolt?
We believe that answering these questions could yield further insight into factional belief
that could inform its application in other settings.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4
Recall that (Ω, Σ, Pr) is a probability space and that I denotes a set of agents. For our proof
below, we borrow the following properties of the belief operator Bpi , from Monderer and
Samet [14]. The properties are numbered for consistency with their paper.
Proposition A.1 (Proposition 2 from Monderer and Samet [14]).
For each 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, i ∈ I , and E, F ∈ Σ,
B
p
i (Bpi (E)) = Bpi (E). (6)
If E ⊆ F , then Bpi (E) ⊆ Bpi (F ). (7)
If (En) is a decreasing sequence of events, then Bpi (∩nEn) = ∩nBpi (En). (8)
Given the above proposition, the proof closely follows Monderer’s and Samet’s proof of
their Proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The proof is split into two arguments, one for each of the
conclusions of the proposition:
(1) First, we show that
(
Fnµ
)∞
n=1
is a decreasing sequence:
By definition of Fnµ , for each n ≥ 1, there exists J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that ∀j ∈ J ,
Fnµ ⊆ Bpj (Fn−1µ ).
As a result, by (6) and (7),
∃ J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I | s.t. ∀j ∈ J , Bpj (Fnµ ) ⊆ Bpj (Bpj (Fn−1µ )) = Bpj (Fn−1µ ).
So, for all n ≥ 1, we have
Fn+1µ ⊆
⋂
j ∈J
B
p
j (Fnµ ) ⊆
⋂
j ∈J
B
p
j (Fn−1µ ) ⊆ Fnµ .
Now, for all n ≥ 1, let j ∈ J . Then, we have
Ep,µ (F ) ⊆ Fn+1µ ⊆ Bpj (Fnµ ).
Therefore, Ep,µ (F ) ⊆ ⋂n≥1 Bpj (Fnµ ), which by (8), implies
Ep,µ (F ) ⊆ Bpj
(⋂
n≥1
Fnµ
)
= B
p
j
(
Ep,µ (F )) .
This shows that Ep,µ (F ) is an evident (p, µ)-belief.
It also follows that Ep,µ (F ) ⊆ F 1µ ⊆ Bpj (F ) for all j in some J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ µ |I |.
(2) If ω ∈ Ep,µ (F ), then by (1), F is common (p, µ)-belief at ω.
On the other hand, suppose that F is common (p, µ)-belief at ω.
Let the event E (with ω ∈ E) and J ⊆ I be as in the definition of common (p, µ)-belief.
We will show, by induction, that E ⊆ Fnµ for all n ≥ 1.
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For the base case, it follows from the definition of common (p, µ)-belief that for each
j ∈ J , E ⊆ Bpj (F ), which implies that E ⊆ F 1µ .
Now, suppose E ⊆ Fnµ . Then using the fact that E is an evident (p, µ)-belief, there
must exist some J ′ ⊆ I with with |J | ≥ µ |I | such that for each j ∈ J ′, E ⊆ Bpj (E).
Applying (7) for each j ∈ J ′ we have that E ⊆ Bpj (E) ⊆ Bpj (Fnµ ) for each j ∈ J ′,
which implies that
E ⊆
⋂
j ∈J ′
B
p
j (Fnµ ) ⊆ Fn+1µ .
□
B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2
Proof. We will reduce a classic NP-complete problem, Cliqe, to Revolt.
Definition B.1 (Clique). Cliqe
Given: (G,k), where G = (V ,E) is an (undirected) graph with |V | = n and k ∈ N>0.
Question: Does G contain a clique of size k?
Given an instance of Cliqe (G,k), we define a prior P , summarized in the tables below:
Parameter Value
p 1
µ kn
Table 5. Parameter values of the prior P .
BLANKLINE
s = A s = B
Pr[State = s] 12 12
Pr[α |State = s] 0 0
Pr[χ |State = s] 0.99 0
Pr[ν |State = s] 0.01 1
Table 6. Summary of relevant distributions
for the prior P .
Then, we consider an instance of Revolt with input (G, P , µ∗ = kn ,q∗ = 0.99
k
2 ). (Clearly,
defining this instance can be done in polynomial time with respect to n.)
Now, suppose that G contains a clique of size k . Then, with probability at least q∗, all
of the agents that form the clique will be of type χ . When this is the case, they will each
observe the types of their neighbors, and will believe with probability 1 that all k agents
that form the clique (including themselves) feel secure enough to revolt. As a result, a
revolt of size at least kn = µ
∗ is supported with probability at least q∗ in G under the prior
P .
On the other hand, suppose that a revolt of size at least µ∗ is supported with probability
at least q∗ in G under the prior P . That is, suppose the event that at least k agents feel
secure enough to revolt occurs (call this event E) with probability at least q∗ > 0.
For E to occur, at least k agents of type χ must believe with probability 1 that at least
k − 1 other agents (of type χ ) feel secure enough to revolt. This is only possible, though,
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when the existence of at least k agents of type χ is common knowledge among a group of
at least k χ -type agents.
As a result of the limited information available to each agent, common knowledge of
the existence of k agents of type χ can only occur within a clique of k agents. This follows
from that fact that in order to be certain of another agent’s reasoning about some observed
information (here, the type of some agent or agents), an agent i must observe that the other
agent j observes the same information and also observe that j observes that i observes the
information, and so on.
In order for E to occur, this kind of mutual reasoning must happen among k χ -type
agents, each of whom would need to be a neighbor of the other k − 1 to facilitate the
mutual observation of each others’ types. That is, they would need to form a clique of k
agents.6 E occurs with non-zero probability, so there must exist a clique of size k in G . □
We note here that in addition to establishing NP-hardness, this proof demonstrates that
in order to achieve the exactness required to solve Revolt, an algorithm must use more
information than just agent degrees, which, as we show, are sufficient for the relaxation
Promise Revolt.
We also conjecture that Revolt is #P-hard.
C A CHERNOFF-HOEFFDING BOUND FOR SETTINGS WITH LOCAL
DEPENDENCE
For a standard Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound, we consider taking the sum of independent
random variables. However, similar bounds exist for sums of dependent random variables
when the dependence between the variables is constrained. Borrowing from a book on
concentration of measure by Dubhashi and Panconesi [9], we consider the case where
dependencies between the variables are encoded in a dependency graph Γ.
Formally, let Γ be a graph on n vertices such that for each vertex i ∈ [n], the following
property holds: if i is not adjacent to a distinct vertex j ∈ n in Γ, then Xi is independent
from X j .
Let χ ∗(Γ) denote the fractional chromatic number of Γ, which represents the smallest
possible ratio ab of positive integers a,b such that the vertices of Γ can each be assigned a
set of b colors from a total set of a colors under the constraint that adjacent vertices must
be assigned disjoint sets of colors. (A formal definition of the fractional chromatic number
can be found in Dubhashi and Panconesi [9].)
Theorem C.1 (Theorem 3.2 in Dubhashi and Panconesi [9]).
Suppose X =
∑n
i=1Xi where 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1 for each i . Then, for t > 0,
Pr[X ≥ E[X ] + t], Pr[X ≤ E[X ] − t] ≤ exp
( −2t2
χ ∗(Γ)n
)
.
6See Chwe’s paper [6] for a similar setting where cliques are necessary for common knowledge.
